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Abstract
CEO DUALITY AND ITS IMPACT ON LARGE PUBLICLY TRADED BANK
HOLDING COMPANIES
The objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between CEO duality
(chainnan of the board and CEO are the same individual) and fInn perfonnance and
effIciency for a sample of large publicly traded bank holding companies. Prior
research in this area is conflicting on whether or not management structure is of
signifIcance in regards to perfonnance and cost effIciency. The motivation for this
line of research is that fInns are questioning if principal-agent conflicts are involved
when the CEO is also chainnan of the board. The perfonnance measures used in this
study are: return on assets, Tobin's q, and market-to-book value. The effIciency
measure used is general selling and administration expenses to total assets. This study
is particularly unique in the way top management structures are grouped. Top
management structures are grouped by chainnan to avoid the possible principal-agent
conflicts that may occur when a chainnan is not CEO but holds another executive
position. There was no evidence provided by this study that banks where the CEO is
also chainnan of the board undetperfonn those banks where the CEO is not chainnan
of the board.
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1994). Corporations want to know what the implications of CEO duality are on
perfonnance and efficiency.
Baliga, Moyer and Rao (1994) suggest that, on average, the market is
indifferent to changes in a finn's duality status. Baliga, et al., in an examination of
the relationship between CEO duality and finn perfonnance, use the industryadjusted, standardized market value added ratio to investigate the announcement
effects of changes in duality status, accounting measures of operating perfonnance for
finns that have changed their duality structure, and long-tenn measures of
perfonnance for finns that have had a consistent history of duality structure. There
proved to be little evidence of operating perfonnance changes around changes in
duality status. In their study some evidence was found that when a duality structure
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(the same person holding both CEO and chairman positions) is adopted, other
management disciplining mechanisms are put in place, such as capital structure and
dividend policy changes.
Pi and Timme (1993) provide the motivation for the current study. Their
results show that, on average, banks in which the CEO is also chairman underperfonn
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those banks where the CEO is not chairman. Also, their results indicated that the
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efficiency. This indicates that Chairman-CEO banks are more output inefficient

difference in perfonnance was greater for ROA (perfonnance measure) than for cost

(ability to generate revenues) than they are input inefficient (ability to control costs)
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compared to the Nonchairman-CEO banks. From Pi and Timme's results, it can be
implied that for those banks where the CEO is also chainnan, internal monitoring
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controls may not be as effective as if those two positions were separated.
The argument of proponents of duality is that it provides better strategic
visioning, consistency in goals, objectives and strategies and clear cut leadership and
managerial responsibility (Anderson and Anthony, 1986). However, opponents of
duality claim that duality inhibits board independence and reduces the possibility that
the board can properly execute its oversight and governance role (Fizel and Louie,
1990) .
One of the main issues CEO duality raises is that of principal-agent conflicts.
Pi and Timme (1993) report that when the CEO is also chairman of the board,
principal-agent conflicts are likely to occur because of the consolidation of the
decision management and the decision control processes.

In this situation, internal

control monitoring devices may be deficient. Given that one of the board's central
functions is to monitor the performance of top management, allowing the CEO to
perform both rolls is thought to compromise the desired system of checks and
balances (Rechner and Dalton, 1991). The CEO would seem to be more easily
tempted to perform acts that benefit his/her own interest instead of what is in the
company's best interest. This is why there is the potential for the principal-agent
conflict to exist in a CEO duality structure.

Differences in this study
There are several differences between this study and the research performed by
Pi and Timme (1993). One of the main differences in this study from Pi ed Timme
is the Chairman/CEO title designations. Pi and Timme grouped their sample by CEO

4
as follows: 1) CEO who is also chainnan of the board and president, 2) CEO who
is chainnan of the board and another individual who is president, and 3) CEO who is
president and another individual who is chainnan of the board. This study compares
the performance and performance-ownership and board structure relationships for
banks in which the CEO is also president but not chainnan, henceforth referred to as
the 'NonchainnaniCEO'

group and banks in which the CEO is chainnan and possibly

also president, henceforth referred to as the 'ChainnaniCEO'

group.

The grouping of the top management structures by the chainnan position, as
done here, is advantageous because it considers fIrms in which the chainnan holds
another executive position as having a duality structure. This is important because
principal-agent conflicts could conceivably occur if the chainnan was allowed an
executive position. The role of top management is the management of decisions and
the role of chainnan is the control of decisions. These functions should be separated
to prevent principal-agent conflicts. A chainnan who also holds an executive position
has a potential principal-agent conflict and must be considered in the ChainnaniCEO
group.
The next important difference between this research and Pi and Timme's is the
performance and effIciency measures used. In Pi and Timme's study, ROA and a
percentage production cost effIciency derived from a stochastic cost frontier model are
used. This study uses three performance measures: return on assets,. market-to-book
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value, Tobin's q, and one efficiency measure, general selling and administration
expenses to total assets. In the bank performance literature, return on book assets and
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5
return on book equity are most commonly used, in addition to Tobin's q. All three
performance measures were chosen in this study for purposes of comparison.
Expenses to total assets was chosen as a cost efficiency measure because it was
accessible from COMPACT DISCLOSURE.

A drawback to this measure is that it

does not take into account banks differing by the scale and/or mix of outputs (Pi and
Timme, 1993).
A third difference is the ownership structure used. Pi and Timme use CEO
percentage ownership and this study uses officer and director percentage ownership.
Using CEO percentage ownership would have been preferred, however, it was not
accessible from COMPACT DISCLOSURE.
The fmal difference is in the model used to examine the hypotheses. The base
study used two additional control variables: the five bank concentration ratio using
total banking assets associated with the state in which the bank has its headquarters,
and a dummy variable which equals 1 if a bank is located in a state with statewide
banking laws and zero otherwise. These variable would have been very difficult to
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obtain and therefore were not used in this study.

BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS
Chairman! CEO title designations
Top management structures were of three types, grouped by chainnan:

(1)

chairman who is also CEO, (2) chairman who is not CEO, but who holds another
executive position, and (3) chairman who is not CEO and holds no other executive
position.
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The breakdown of the three management structures in the sample are as
follows: the chainnan is also CEO in 82 % of the sample, the chainnan is not CEO
but holds another executive position in 2 % of the sample, and the chainnan is not
CEO and holds no other executive position in 16 % of the sample.
In the model described in the next section, if a bank's chainnan is also CEO
or some other executive officer, a dummy variable (Chair&CEO) is assigned a value
of one, and the subgroup is referred to as the Chainnan/CEO group. If the chairman
is not the CEO or another executive officer, the dummy variable is zero. This
subgroup is referred to as Chainnan/NonCEO.

Performance and efficiency measures
In this study, the performance of the bank holding companies is examined
using the following three performance measures: return on assets (ROA) market-tobook value (MV/BV), and Tobin's q (Q). Also, one cost efficiency measure is
examined, general selling and administration expenses to total assets (EFF). Tobin's
q is defmed as the sum of book value of debt plus market value of equity divided by
the sum of book value of debt plus book value of equity.
The drawback to using return on assets is that it relies on accounting earnings
and book value of assets. Market-to-book value and Tobin's q provide good tools of

I

18

.

.

.
.

comparison because they take into account market value.

Ownership structure
Many studies have related management ownership to a fum's performance

.
.
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showing a correlation between the amount of management ownership and a fIrm's
performance.

The more management has invested in a fIrm, the more they want to

see that fIrm's performance do well. This effect is taken into account in this study.
Management ownership is measured as the end-of-year offIcer and director percentage
ownership.

Insider ownership reduces the principal-agent conflicts because

performance not in accordance with the fIrm's best interest will harm managers
because they will incur a larger share of the costs.

DATA, MODEL SPECIFICATIONS

AND STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES

The data
The Chairman/CEO titles and all other data were retrieved from COMPACT
DISCLOSURE.

The data for all bank holding companies as of the year ending

12/31/93 were retrieved from the fIrst quarter 1995 COMPACT DISCLOSURE
database. The December 1993 COMPACT DISCLOSURE database was then
examined to ensure the continuity of duality structure. If a bank holding company
had the chairman being a different person from the CEO in the fIrst quarter 1995
COMPACT DISCLOSURE and then had the chairman being the same person as the
CEO in the December 1993 COMPACT DISCLOSURE, then this was considered to
be a change in duality structure. All banks with changing duality structure in this
time period were not included in the study. The entire sample consisted of 144 bank
holding companies. The constraining factors to come to this sample size from a
population of 6,712 bank holding companies were banks with assets greater than one
billion dollars and limited to those banks having all information needed.
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The model
The model used to investigate the hypotheses in this study is specified as:

In the model, 7r is either ROA, MV /BV, Q, or EFF for the year ending 1993,
and %Off&Dir is the officer and director ownership at the end of that year.
Chair&CEO is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the chairman is also CEO or
another executive officer and 0 otherwise. r is a vector of estimated coefficients for
the control variables in X for the same time period and n is an additive error term.
The control variables in X are the log of total assets for each bank and the total loan
to total assets for each bank. These control variables control for the different sizes of
the bank holding companies in the sample and are used in Pi and Timme's study.

Statement of hypotheses:
The above model is used to test the following null hypotheses:
H.l: There will be equality of performance for Chairman/CEO and
Chairman/NonCEO banks.
H.2: There will be no relationship between performance and Off/Dir
ownership for Chairman/NonCEO banks.
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H.3: There will be no relationship between performance and Off/Dir
ownership for Chairman/CEO banks.
H.4: There is no structural differences in the performance-Off/Dir ownership
relationship for Chairman/NonCEO and Chairman/CEO banks.
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RESULTS

Summary statistics
Summary statistics for the performance and efficiency, ownership, and control
variables classified for Chairman-CEO and Chairman-Non CEO banks are presented in
Table 1. Table 1 shows that the mean ROA for the Chairman/CEO sample banks is
1.10 %, which is significantly different from the mean ROA for the
Chairman/NonCEO sample banks of 0.95 %. The mean market-to-book value of the
two sample groups is not significantly different with means of 1.44 % and 1.43 % for
the Chairman/CEO and the Chairman/Non CEO groups, respectively.

The results for

Tobin's q also follow this pattern with a mean of 1.34 for the Chairman/CEO group
and a mean of 1.29 for the Chairman/NonCEO group.
The efficiency measure of expenses to total assets is significantly different
between the two groups. The Chairman/CEO has a mean of 3.84% with a median of
3.67 %, indicating that the data is slightly skewed toward higher expenses to total
assets. The Chairman/NonCEO group has a mean of 3.04% with a median of
3.30 %, indicating that the data is slightly skewed toward lower expenses to total
assets.
The officer and director ownership structure for the sample banks is
significantly different from that of Pi and Timme (1993). Pi and Timme have a much
lower percentage because their study used CEO ownership. The mean (median)
values of Off/Dir ownership for the Chairman/CEO group and the
Chairman/NonCEO group are 9.50% (5.68%) and 16.83% (15.31 %), respectively.
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TABLE 1
Summary Statistics for 144 Large Publicly Traded Bank Holding Companies
(standard deviations in parentheses)
Performance

& Efficiency Measures
Chair/CEO

12/31/93
Chair/NonCEO

N=118

N=26

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Diff. in
means
(t-stat.)

Return on Assets

1.10%
(.0037)

1.11%

.95%
(.0039)

1.00%

0.15%
(4.96)b

Market -to-Book

1.44%
(.5132)

1.36%

1.43%
(.5138)

1.46%

0.01%
(0.00)

Tobin's Q

1.34
(.3719)

1.27

1.29
(.3090)

1.23

0.05
(0.00)

Expenses to Total
Assets

3.84%
(.0145)

3.67%

3.04%
(.0104)

3.30%

0.80%
(1.92Y

Officer & Director Ownership

12/31/93

Chair/CEO

Officer & Director

N=26

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Diff. in
means
(t-stat.)

9.50%
(.1263)

5.68%

16.83%
(.1089)

15.31 %

-7.33%
(-.09)

Control Variables

12/31/93

Chair/CEO

Total Assets
($ooos)

Chair/NonCEO

N=118

N=118

Chair/NonCEO

N=26

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Diff. in
means
(t-stat. )

18,828,191
(34,543,759)

6,530,530

8,068,917
(25,248,274)

2,535,784

10,759,274
(0.00)

59.24%

58.77%
(.1462)

63.30%

-0.69%
(-.02)

Loans to
58.08%
(.1120)
Total Assets
g
a~lcant
at the 0.05 level
bSignificant at the 0.01 level

,
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The difference between the two groups is not statistically significant.
Finally, Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the control variables. The
mean statistics show that the Chairman/CEO sample banks on average have $18.8
billion in total assets, whereas the Chairman/Non CEO sample banks on average have
$8.1 billion in total assets. However, both groups have much lower medians at $6.5
billion and $2.5 billion for the Chairman/CEO group and the Chairman/NonCEO
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group, respectively, indicating that the data is skewed toward banks having higher
total assets. Additionally, both groups have a similar percentage of loans to total
assets.
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Performance. Chairman/CEO designation. and Director/Officer ownership
relationships
The regression results using ROA, Tobin's q, market-to-book value, and
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expenses to total assets are reported in Table 2. Test statistics for the hypotheses
H.1-H.4 for the performance management ownership relationships are reported in
Table 3 for ROA, Q, MV/BV, and EFF. The test statistics reported in Table 3 are
derived from the regression results in Table 2.
Equality of return on assets, Tobin's q, and market-to-book value
The test of the hypothesis of quality of ROAs for Chairman/NonCEO and
Chairman/CEO groups (H.1), reported in Table 3, indicates that the hypothesis cannot
be rejected. The hypothesis also cannot be rejected for the equality of Tobin's q, and
market -to-book value. This indicates that there is no statistical evidence that there is
inequality of performance for Chairman/CEO and Chairman/NonCEO banks. This
evidence is not consistent with.Pi and Timme's results in that the hypothesis could be

I
I
I
I
I
I
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TABLE 2
Regression Results for Relationship Between Performance, Chairman/CEO
Designations and Inside Ownership Structure for Publicly Traded Bank Holding
Companies (standard errors in parentheses)
Return on
Assets

Tobin's
Q

Market -toBook Value

Expenses to
Total Assets

Intercept

.0018
(.0065)

2.377
(.6111)b

2.6771
(.8763)b

-.0117
(.0234)

Chair&CEO

.0025
(.0015Y

.2012
(.1401)

.0406
(.2009)

.0136
(.0054)b

% Officer &
Director

.0098
(.0071)

.6521
(.6703)

-.0393
(.9613)

.0417
(.0256)

Chair&CEO *
%Off&Dir

-.0062
(.0076)

-.7379
(.7168)

.OlO3
(1.0279)

-.0432
(.0274)

Total Assets

.0004
(.0003)

.0478
(.0257)a

-.0449
(.0369)

.0017
(.OOlO)a

Loans/Total
Assets

-.0033
(.0027)

-.2563
(.2593)

-.4380
(.3718)

-.0040
(.0099)

.0220

.0063

-.0148

.0529

Independent
Variables

l

I
~
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Control
Variables

Adjusted R2
as!gmitlcant at the .10 level.
bSignificant at the .01 level.

rejected and suggested that Chainnan/CEO banks underperfonn Nonchainnan/CEO
banks statistically and economically.

One of the reasons we cannot say there is

inequality of perfonnance for Chainnan/CEO and Chainnan/NonCEO banks may be
that the management structure does not have a significant impact on perfonnance.
This is possibly shown by the fact that there are so many bank holding companies
with a duality structure.
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One thing to consider regarding CEO duality is that there are many bank
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holding companies, ftrms and corporations that have a duality structure. This is of
interest because with the assumption of market efftciency, why would the duality
structure be prominent if it was inferior to the independent structure?

18
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Return on assets, Tobin's q, market-to-book value and Officer and Director ownership
The test statistics in Table 3 show that when the Chair&CEO variables are
included, there is not a signiftcant positive relationship between Chairman/Non CEO
ownership and ROA. Hence, the hypothesis of no relationship between performance
and Chairman/NonCEO ownership (11.2) cannot be rejected. This follows for Tobin's
q, market-to-book value, and expenses to total assets. The results in Table 3 also
show that the hypothesis of no relationship between ROA, Q, MV /BV and

III

Chairman/CEO ownership (11.3) cannot be rejected. Finally, the hypothesis (11.4) of

II

no structural difference in the performance-ownership relationship for

.

Chairman/NonCEO and Chairman/CEO banks cannot be rejected. Pi and Timme

.
,
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were able to reject hypotheses H.2 and H.4, but were not able to reject H.3. One
possible reason for this study not being able to reject H.2 and H.3, may be because
Offtcer and Director ownership was used instead of CEO ownership. CEO ownership
is more directly correlated to the performance of duality structures.
Equality of cost efficiency
The test statistic in Table 3 for the hypothesis of equal cost efficiency for
Chairman/CEO and Chairman/NonCEO banks (11.1) is not signiftcantly different from
zero and therefore suggests that the hypothesis cannot be rejected. Pi and Timme fmd
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TABLE 3
Estimated Values From Tests of Hypotheses for the Relationships Between
Performance, Ownership and Board Structure for Chairman/NonCEO and
Chairman/CEO banks.
Performance, and Performance-Officer & Director Ownership Relationships
using the model:
'R'=Bo+ B1Chair&CEO+ B2%Off&Dir+ ~Chair&CEO*%Off&Dir+
I"X + n

.
.
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Hypotheses and Parameter
Restrictions

Return on
Assets

Tobin's
Q

Market-toBook Value

Expenses to
Total Assets

H.t Equality of perfonnance for
Chainnan/NonCEO and
Chainnan/CEO banks
(Bl + B3 = 0)

.3324

.7776

.0012

1.6193

H.2 No relationship between
perfonnance and Off/Dir
ownership for
Chainnan/NonCEO banks
(B2 = 0)

.0098
(1.3780)

.6521
(.9370)

-.0393
(-.0410)

.0417
(1.627)

H.3 No relationship between
perfonnance and Off/Dir
ownership for Chainnan/CEO
banks (B2 + B3 = 0)

1.3972

.0885

.0144

.0183

H.4 No structural differences in
the perfonnance-Off/Dir
ownership relationship for
Chainnan/NonCEO and
Chainnan/CEO banks (B3 = 0)
-statIstIcs m p arentheses.

-.0062
(-.8140)

-.7379
(-1. 0290)

-.0103
(-.0100)

-.0432
(-1.5760)

similar results. Again, this may be consistent with the theory that management
structure does not have a significant impact on efficiency, which may be evidenced by
the fact that so many bank holding companies have a duality structure.
Cost efficiency and officer and director ownership
The test statistic in Table 3 for H.2 indicates that the hypothesis of no
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relationship between efficiency and Chainnan/NonCEO ownership cannot be rejected.
Also as shown in Table 3, the test statistic for the hypothesis H.3 cannot be rejected.
Finally, the hypothesis (H.4) of no structural differences in the cost efficiencyownership relationship for the Chainnan/NonCEO and Chainnan/CEO groups cannot
be rejected. Pi and Timme were able to reject all three hypotheses. Again, this may
be due to the use of Officer and Director ownership instead of CEO ownership.
Results versus Pi and Timme's results
Pi and Timme's results suggest that performance is lower for Chainnan/CEO
banks and positively (negatively or not) related to Nonchainnan/CEO
(Chainnan/CEO) ownership.

~
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These results are not inconsistent with the hypothesis

that CEOs who are also chainnan exhibit excess power, which may be due to lack of
separation of the decision management and decision control processes.

The results

suggest that for both ROA and cost efficiency, the negative effects of this
consolidation of power are emphasized with increases in CEO ownership.
The results of this study are inconsistent with the Pi and Timme's results. The
evidence was not consistent with being able to reject the null hypotheses. Therefore,
this study can not conclude that Chainnan/NonCEO banks outperform Chainnan/CEO
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banks on a performance or cost efficiency basis. Also, this study can not conclude on
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the relationship between officer and director ownership and performance.

It

DISCUSSION
Something of particular interest noted in this study is that there seems to be a
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high tendency for bank holding companies to have in place a duality structure. This
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conclusion is made from the sample containing 118 banks having a duality structure
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and only 26 having an independent structure. Why would such a large percentage of
the sample banks have a duality structure if a duality structure underperforms and is
less efficient than an independent structure? If the independent structure was
preferred, wouldn't the market realize this and show a greater percentage of bank
holding companies with an independent structure?
In conclusion, the results of this study show that the evidence was not
consistent with Pi and Timme. Pi and Timme (1993) were able to reject the null
hypotheses and conclude that on average banks where the CEO is also chairman of
I

the board underperform those banks where the CEO is not chairman of the board.

!

Also, Pi and Timme's results indicated that the relative difference in performance was

~

greater for ROA than for cost efficiency. This study was not able to conclude this for
any of the performance measures (return on assets, market-to-book value) or for the
efficiency measure (expenses to total assets).
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